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Abstract 
This thesis is an empirical examination of the demand side of the rental housing market in 
Gothenburg. The study is done in collaboration with Boplats Göteborg, the main housing 
agency in the city. Due to certain regulations on the rental housing market, the demand 
cannot be fully observed through the price mechanism. In this paper, the demand for an 
apartment (days since agency registration required for getting a first-hand contract) is 
decomposed into a price component and several apartment-specific characteristics in a linear 
model. Empirically, some extra focus is put on the districts of Majorna and Kungsladugård – 
two areas where a large share of the total housing consists of rental apartments, and where 
the demand for housing is exceptionally high. The results suggest that the geographic 
location to a very large extent determine the queuing time required. The monthly rents and 
(to some extent) the floors are also significant determinants. In addition, both Majorna and 
Kungsladugård seem to have extremely strong area effects, even when the lower rents in 
these areas are controlled for.  
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1.1. Introduction 
The prices on detached houses and tenant-owned apartments in Sweden have risen very 
sharply during the last two decades, especially in the metropolitan areas. According to the 
Swedish business site E24 Näringsliv, the general price level on tenant-owned apartments 
during the years 2000-2010 increased by 153 %. What factors have been driving these price 
increases is a question frequently discussed and heavily debated by economists, journalists 
and politicians. However, it is reasonable to claim that it, at least to some extent, reflects the 
problematic and challenging situation that people face if instead looking for apartments on 
the rental housing market. There is a high and increasing demand for housing in the 
metropolitan areas, but the supply of apartments is growing very slowly. This problem is the 
topic of Turner (2001), in which the causes of the disequilibrium are explained and potential 
market improvements are discussed. 
The high prices undoubtedly make ownership housing inconvenient for low-income 
households and people that want to move rather frequently, since there are large transaction 
costs involved. Also, some people will simply tend to have preferences to rent apartments 
rather than to buy them. Obviously, the demand for rental housing will depend on how large 
these groups of people are. The market for rental housing, which these groups of people will 
turn to, works in a completely different way compared to the free markets on which houses 
and tenant-owned apartments are traded. Rather than on bidding auctions, prices of rental 
apartments are set in local negotiations between organizations representing the two parties 
(landlords and tenants). The characteristics and price-setting on this market will be 
described in more detail in section 2.  
The focus of this paper is on the demand side of the rental housing market. What is the 
composition of the demand for rental housing? How do households value particular 
apartment characteristics? How do people value the different geographical areas of 
Gothenburg in terms of demand for housing? To what extent does the monthly rent 
determine the demand? These questions will be important in the future, as landlords (both 
private and public) will probably be forced to build new apartments due to the massive and 
growing demand surplus. 
Two of the districts in which it is very difficult to get an apartment are Kungsladugård and 
Majorna. These two areas are located in the central-western part of Gothenburg, and many of 
the apartment buildings here are old and characteristic. Old apartment buildings in general 
tend to come with lower monthly rents. According to the rental housing agency Boplats 
Göteborg, people will on average have to wait approximately 8 years to get a first-hand 
contract in these districts. What is the reason behind the strong demand for these contracts? 
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Is it simply due to the lower rents or does the characteristic “feeling” of the area matter as 
well? These two area-specific effects will be tested formally. 
To attack these questions without good data on household behavior would be a very 
problematic (if not impossible) task, since the demand for apartments in Gothenburg is 
sufficiently high for virtually any first-hand contract to be accepted by someone almost 
instantly. Again, the price cannot tell how attractive an apartment is, since it is not set on the 
market. Nevertheless, by studying the number of applications or the days in queue required 
to get a specific apartment, one can make inference about how people value different 
apartment characteristics. 
Section 2 provides background information about the rental housing market and a literature 
overview, section 3 introduces the theoretical framework of the study, section 4 describes the 
data set, section 5 contains the estimation results and in section 6 the results are discussed 
and conclusions are presented. 
 
1.2 Purpose and Methodology 
The purpose of the study is to examine if and how apartment characteristics shape the 
demand for rental contracts. Many actors on the housing market may be interested in 
household preferences – landlords and tenants as well as politicians and people active in the 
housing sector. By mapping the effects of certain apartment characteristics, the preferences 
will be outlined. In addition, the purpose of the study is also to determine whether two of the 
most popular housing areas are considered attractive due to the lower rent level in these 
areas or due to something else. 
Quantitative data and regression analysis will be used when examining the relationships. By 
using data on actual (revealed) consumer behavior provided by Boplats Göteborg, the 
obtained results are likely to be reliable and precise. Two straight-forward linear models in 
which queuing time is explained by apartment characteristics will be estimated by Ordinary 
Least Squares. More information on the data set and estimation techniques will be found in 
sections 4 and 5. 
 
2.1. Price Setting on the Rental Housing Market 
The three main types of housing tenure in Sweden are detached houses, tenant-owned 
apartments and rental apartments. Detached houses and tenant-owned apartments are 
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traded on a free market and prices are determined by current supply and demand 
relationships, so that preferences are reflected in the prices. The usual procedure is that the 
prices are determined on bidding auctions, where the highest bid wins the auction. The 
market for rental housing, on the other hand, works very differently. This market will be in 
focus almost exclusively throughout the paper.  
According to Atterhög (2003), the price setting system on the Swedish rental housing market 
is neither a pure price regulation system nor a free market where prices adjust to their true 
equilibrium levels. The main idea is that prices are set according to the so-called utility value 
principle (in Swedish: bruksvärdesmetoden, bruksvärdesprincipen). The utility value 
principle was designed in order to let the features and the level of quality be reflected in the 
price, but at the same time work as a price regulation so that cities remain, or become, 
socially integrated. Despite this principle, the costs on the production side have tended to 
influence the price levels significantly, as shown by Björklund and Klingborg (2002). How 
the utility value principle works in practice will be described in more detail in the following 
sections. 
Since it is not possible for the landlords themselves to decide on the rent levels, price 
competition is probably not the main source of competition on the market. Instead, there is 
certainly some deal of competition in quality going on. Any level of housing quality is allowed 
from a legal point of view, given that some minimum requirements are fulfilled. But when it 
comes to metropolitan areas, such as that of Gothenburg, incentives for landlords to invest in 
a higher quality level than the minimum requirements rarely exist. The demand for housing 
is high enough for the apartments to be accepted even if they come with a relatively low 
standard. Furthermore, Atterhög (2003) argues that small-sized investments are hard to use 
as a reason for raising prices. Hence, a landlord might face quite strong incentives to take on 
a few large investments, but weak incentives to take on several small ones. For the landlords, 
especially for the small private owners, large investments might be hard to finance. Also, the 
utility value principle involves some rigidity, which implies that investments do not raise 
housing prices instantly, but start to yield payoffs after some time. 
As for any other market, price regulation in terms of monthly rent has some real and intuitive 
effects on the economy. At least in the attractive metropolitan areas, the regulation will 
certainly drive the rents substantially below the market level. The supply of apartments is 
fixed in the short run. The very simple illustration in Figure 2-1 shows the effect of market 
rents (Rm) and rent regulation (Rr). 
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Figure 2-1. Short-run and long-run effects of rent control on the economy.  
Source: O’Sullivan (2003). The illustration has been slightly simplified. 
The idea is that in the short run, fixing the rent below the true equilibrium level basically 
works as a redistribution of wealth from landlords to tenants. In the long run, however, the 
supply will respond to the lower monthly rent and adjust downwards. When adjusted 
completely, there will be a shortage of apartments, represented by the red gap between long-
run supply and demand (O’Sullivan, 2003, p. 490). 
So, how are prices set in practice? How is the utility value principle implemented in 
situations of actual rent setting? One example of such implementation is the rent guidelines 
provided by SABO (2010), an organization representing the public housing companies, in 
their booklet Sätt rätt hyra. The guidelines include information about how different 
geographical locations, building types, kitchen standards, bathroom standards, balconies, 
ventilation systems, laundry rooms etc. could affect the rent setting. It also includes a 
number of more general definitions. For instance, a room has to be at least 10 m2 to be 
defined as a proper room. Rooms between 6 m2 and 10 m2 are defined as half-rooms. The 
booklet gives a good view on how the utility value principle works in practice, but also shows 
that the system is rather complex. Again, the idea of rents being set in local negotiations is 
central on the Swedish rental housing market, and the utility value principle is the main 
framework in such negotiations. 
 
2.2. Distribution of Rental Housing Contracts in Gothenburg 
How first-hand contracts on rental apartments are distributed varies across the Swedish 
municipalities. In Gothenburg, the company named Boplats Göteborg has the main 
responsibility for this particular function. The company is basically a housing agency, owned 
by the municipality together with the public housing companies Bostads AB Poseidon, 
Göteborgs Stads Bostads AB, Familjebostäder i Göteborg AB and the landlord interest 
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organization Fastighetsägarna Göteborg Första Regionen. Boplats Göteborg does not hold 
any apartments, but work only as a distributor of rental contracts – i.e. as a link between 
landlords and tenants. The remainder of this section focuses on how the distribution of rental 
housing contracts in Gothenburg works. 
People apply for first-hand contracts on available apartments via the agency webpage 
www.boplats.se or by visiting the local office. Each household enters certain information 
when registering, such as income level, number of persons in the household and current 
housing situation. The households also specify some desired characteristics of their potential 
future apartments, so that they can get accurate contract offers on the webpage. 
To apply for apartments, the households simply have to sign in on the Boplats Göteborg 
webpage (presented in Appendix 1) and click on any available object. A household may apply 
for one or several apartments at the same time. There is no maximum number of 
simultaneous applications – basically, a household can be involved in an unlimited number 
of application processes at the same time. If a particular household is selected for a contract, 
an email with further information will be sent to the applicant. One of the selected 
households will then finally get to sign the contract and have first-hand access to the 
apartment. When a contract has signed, the registration time of the household is reset. 
Households may decide to reject an apartment that they have applied for. However, 
information about the household rejecting an apartment offer is stored in the system. 
Landlords may take this information into account when selecting applicants. 
Broadly, the selection process works as follows. Public housing companies pick the applicant 
with the longest queue time, conditional on that the applicant fulfills the requirements that 
the company has set. It can for instance be yearly income requirements or a maximum 
number of persons in the household. Private landlords, on the other hand, decide whichever 
candidate they want – they are not forced to pick candidates by queue time. For the private 
landlords, Boplats Göteborg is simply a service for contract distribution. Private landlords 
use whichever channels they want when distributing their contract, and they are not in any 
way obliged to post available apartments on the Boplats Göteborg webpage. However, several 
large private housing companies, as well as smaller ones, use the Boplats Göteborg as a 
convenient alternative to announce available contracts. 
A special kind of first-hand contracts are referred to as student apartments. Such contracts 
are given to students only (usually students at the University of Gothenburg or Chalmers 
University of Technology) and the apartments tend to be relatively small. When the studies 
are finished, the student will have to leave the apartment and the contract is again distributed 
to a student via Boplats Göteborg. Since 2007, one of the suppliers of student apartments, 
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Chalmers Studentbostäder, allows students to sign contracts without giving up their queuing 
time – a feature referred to at the Boplats webpage as “maintained queuing time".  
 
2.3. Literature Overview 
There are many ways to study the demand for rental housing. For instance, qualitative 
methods, such as interviews and case studies, have been used rather frequently. In Homo 
Domesticus, Vigerland (2007) sketches the strategies and preferences of housing consumers 
by focusing on two particular apartment buildings in Östermalm, Stockholm. Again, in the 
central areas of the larger cities in Sweden, there is certainly excess demand on the rental 
housing market. Hence, the shortage in Figure 2-1 presented above makes sense also in the 
Stockholm case. According to Vigerland (2007), the utility value principle does not capture 
the real preferences that people actually have. For this reason, people develop strategies in 
order to use the system to navigate successfully through their “housing career”. Indeed, it 
seems difficult to design an efficient and socially acceptable system for price-setting and 
distribution of rental apartments. Accommodation in general can be considered both a 
human right and a good traded on a market (Bengtsson, 1995), which certainly makes it even 
more problematic to design such a system. 
Based on the methodology introduced by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, Vigerland 
(2007) examines the strategies and the preferences of housing consumers. The results 
suggest that in the two apartment buildings studied, the housing strategies and preferences 
were roughly similar, despite differences in “social composition”. Moreover, when asked a 
hypothetical question about future price increases, people in general seemed willing to keep 
the same apartment even if the rent would increase sharply. This confirms the state of excess 
demand on the housing market in the studied area. It also suggests that there are key 
determinants other than the rent level that determine the popularity of a certain apartment. 
Most importantly, the geographical location seems to matter, according to the author. These 
results imply that price and district variables should definitely be included when studying the 
preferences through quantitative data methods. They also indicate that the price sensitivity in 
the most attractive areas may not be very strong. Other studies that examine housing 
preferences in a broad sense include Coolen and Hoekstra (2001). The approach is 
qualitative, but very different compared to Vigerland (2007). Here, the idea is that stated 
preferences for housing attributes can be explained by motivational, micro-level factors 
stemming from universal values such as power, hedonism and security. 
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Quantitative data has also been used when studying preferences on the rental housing 
market. For instance, in a Master’s thesis by Zahir (2005) at the Royal Institute of 
Technology (Department of Infrastructure, Building and Real Estate Economics) in 
Stockholm, determinants of the queuing time for getting rental apartments are mapped. The 
regression analysis by Zahir (2005) builds upon the idea that the social status of an area, its 
distance from the city center and the monthly rents of the apartments explain the queue time 
needed. The model is examined for 1-room, 2-room and 3-room apartments separately. 
Rather than on apartment features, the focus of the analysis is on the geographical area and 
its characteristics. The results confirm the intuition – that increased monthly rent and 
increased distance to the center decreases the demand, and that high social status of an area 
implies high demand for housing. However, the study by Zahir (2005) has some considerable 
limitations. For instance, the datasets used do not contain any information about the size of 
the apartments (other than the number of rooms). Also, the results reflect the somewhat 
unique situation in Stockholm – by far the largest city in Sweden, with an extreme demand 
surplus for housing in the central districts and with a strict queue system (only queuing time 
matters for contract distribution). The results can hardly be generalized and assumed to be 
valid for Swedish cities in some broader sense. Nevertheless, the methodology is straight-
forward and the explanatory variables included in the theoretical model all make sense. 
Therefore, a fairly similar methodology will be used in this thesis. In terms of apartment 
characteristics variables, though, the model used here will be richer. Also, this study will be 
supported by richer data sets than that of Zahir (2005). 
Households face a choice between renting and owning. O’Sullivan (2003) compares these two 
possible decisions. In a competitive market, landlords make zero profits and households thus 
pay rents equal to the costs faced by their landlords. Although these assumptions are not 
completely in line with the Swedish system described earlier, this framework has some 
interesting and intuitive outcomes. The annual cost of a rental apartment can be described by 
the following equation, 
                    (Annual cost of rental apartment) 
where V is the value of the dwelling, i is the interest rate paid by the property owner, d is the 
depreciation rate, m is the maintenance cost and g is the rate of capital gain. 
Analogously, the annual cost of ownership housing is described by the following equation, 
                     (Annual cost of ownership housing) 
Here, the terms represent costs for the housing occupant rather than for some landlord. 
Obviously, the household is indifferent between renting and owning its housing if Cr = Co. 
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Important to note is that taxes are completely ignored in this framework. Although extremely 
simplified, the above conditions illustrate the basis for this particular household decision in a 
fairly clear way. O’Sullivan (2003) also argues that three other factors tend to make some 
households rent rather than buy their housing: low income households (that lack resources to 
finance the buying), mobility (easier to move between rental dwellings) and distaste for work 
on the home (maintenance and small repairs). 
Some technical issues related to estimation of rental housing demand are outlined by Kim 
(1995). Although the market in South Korea is very different compared to those of many 
Western countries, the author discusses some important issues that possibly makes sense in 
other economies as well. More specifically, problems with implementation of theory and 
estimation of demand are raised and evaluated. The issues are 1) selectivity bias, 2) hedonic 
prices, 3) computation of permanent income and 4) functional forms. The fact that the main 
equation in Kim (1995) contains household characteristics, tastes etc. makes that model 
different to the one that will be used here. Rather than treating the households on the 
demand side as a homogenous mass, Kim (1995) builds on a model in which household 
features co-determine demand. Although methods to tackle the issues are presented, it is 
obvious that by only focusing on apartment characteristics and aggregating the households, 
estimation becomes much more straight-forward. 
Firstly, a selectivity bias problem arises if information on rental data can be collected from 
tenants only. This will not be the case in this study, since the information is gathered from a 
database maintained by the main distributor of rental housing contracts in Gothenburg. 
The second problem recognized is a problem related to estimation of hedonic prices. Such 
estimation is used when variables such as the quantity of housing services cannot be directly 
observed. The hedonic prices approach is described by Kim (1995, p. 60): 
“The assumptions underlying the hedonic approach are that the rent or value 
of a housing unit comes directly from the quantity and types of characteristics 
it contains and that the market prices of these housing characteristics can be 
estimated by pooling information from many dwelling units via a 
multivariate regression analysis between rent and dwelling characteristics.” 
Such multivariate regression is the approach that will be used in this study. Here, however, 
rent will be considered an explanatory variable, exogenously given, since it is not set on the 
market. For further information about price-setting on the Swedish rental housing market, 
see section 2.1. In addition, this study will use a data set that captures data on apartment size, 
number of rooms etc.  
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A problem regarding the permanent income hypothesis is the third issue. It is argued that 
permanent income, rather than measured income, is a key determinant of housing demand. 
For many reasons, it is problematic to estimate permanent (and transitory) income. Kim 
(1995) refers to Goodman and Kawai (1982) for an estimation technique that can be used to 
construct permanent and transitory income from measured income. 
Lastly, the role of the functional form is discussed. Linear and log-linear equations are the 
most common modeling approach, but it is argued that a semi-log functional form would 
sometimes capture the relationships even better. 
 
3. Theoretical Modeling and Hypotheses 
The apartment-specific variables shown on the Boplats Göteborg webpage can be used to 
examine the demand side of the market, since these variables are considered by households 
when they decide whether to apply for an apartment or not. Basically, this is the only 
information available to the potential applicant before he or she gets to see the apartment. 
Therefore, a model built upon these variables should capture real relationships reasonably 
well. Again, compared to the model used by Zahir (2005), the model used here will focus 
more on apartment characteristics. This follows naturally from the fact that Boplats Göteborg 
provides certain information about apartment characteristics when people apply for 
apartments (see Appendix 1). These variables are assumed to be fundamental when 
households take decisions on which apartments to apply for. 
Intuitively, there are two ways of comparing the value between different contracts. The 
number of applications on an apartment is assumed to reflect how the particular contract is 
valued by people – the higher the number of applications, the more valuable contract. The 
number of days since registration required to get a certain contract also captures information 
about the valuation of a contract – a high number of queuing days implies that the contract is 
valued relatively high. The latter alternative will be used here. 
How the contract is valued, in turn, is here assumed to depend on the characteristics and the 
geographic location of the object, as well as on the price (in terms of monthly rent). A linear 
and straight-forward theoretical model is equation (1) below. 
                                                          (1) 
LHS RHS, complete list Description 
QT 
(Queuing time, days 
since registration at 
Boplats Göteborg) 
α 
β0 RENT 
β1 AREA_CENTR 
β2 AREA_OTHER 
Intercept. 
Monthly rent in SEK. 
Location dummy for central Gothenburg. 
Location dummy for other municipalities close to Gothenburg. 
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β3 AREA_MOLND 
β4 AREA_NORTH 
β5 AREA_PARTI 
β6 AREA_EAST 
β7 AREA_WEST 
β8 AREA_MAJOR 
β9 AREA_KUNGS 
β10 FLOOR_B0 
β11 FLOOR_1 
β12 FLOOR_2 
β13 FLOOR_3 
β14 FLOOR_4 
β15 FLOOR_A4 
β16 SIZE 
β17 ROOMS 
β18 STUDENT 
ε 
Location dummy for Mölndal. 
Location dummy for northern Gothenburg. 
Location dummy for Partille. 
Location dummy for eastern Gothenburg. 
Location dummy for western Gothenburg.* 
Location dummy for Majorna. 
Location dummy for Kungsladugard. 
Floor dummy for floors below 0. 
Floor dummy for floor 1. 
Floor dummy for floor 2. 
Floor dummy for floor 3. 
Floor dummy for floor 4. 
Floor dummy for floors above floor 4. 
Apartment size in square meters. 
Number of rooms. 
Student apartment dummy. 
Disturbance term. 
Table 3-1. Equation (1) specified for Gothenburg. AREA_HISIN (Location dummy for Hisingen) and FLOOR_0 (Floor dummy 
for floor 0) constitute the reference area and reference floor, and are therefore not included in the RHS variables list. 
* Majorna and Kungsladugård are not included in AREA_WEST. 
Apart from the main areas of Gothenburg, two particular districts will be examined in more 
detail – Kungsladugård and Majorna. These districts are characterized by a special type of 
architecture (normally “Landshövdingehus”) and the buildings here usually date from the 
turn of the 19th century. The apartments in these buildings generally come with a lower 
standard than that of newly produced apartments, but the buildings give the districts a rather 
unique touch. Furthermore, the price setting practice and the utility value principle described 
earlier do not allow for high rents on such apartments, due to the relatively low quality 
standard. However, the demand is not necessarily affected negatively by the somewhat lower 
quality, since the characteristic feeling of the area and the buildings may outweigh the lack of 
top-notch standards, and since the monthly rents are lower. This is an empirical matter and 
will therefore be discussed after having estimated the model. The problem itself is 
hypothesized below. 
All floors and areas cannot be included in the regression model, since this would create a 
problem of perfect multicollinearity. Instead, some floor and some area must be excluded 
from the model to constitute references when interpreting the effects of other floors and 
areas. Floor zero is chosen as reference floor, since it seems natural to compare effects of 
different floors to the entrance floor. For the area variables, there is no obvious and straight-
forward choice. The area Hisingen will be selected as reference here, due to a large base of 
observations within this area and due to its “heterogeneity”. There are both very attractive 
neighborhoods and less demanded areas located on Hisingen, so the AREA_HISIN variable 
constitutes a good reference for other area effects. Again, the results as such are not affected 
by the choice of references. 
Intuitive expectations on some parameters in equation (1) follow. 
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 Clearly, the coefficient of RENT should be negative, i.e. β0 < 0. Everything else held 
constant, an increase in monthly rent of a certain apartment will lower the demand 
for that particular contract. 
 Intuitively, the AREA coefficients may differ dramatically. Most cities obviously tend 
to have attractive and less attractive neighborhoods. These coefficients will capture 
pure district effects since prices are controlled for in the model. As assumed in Zahir 
(2005) as well as in most other theory on urban housing, it is often considered 
attractive to live in the central parts of the city. Thus, AREA_CENTR should have a 
positive coefficient, i.e. β1 > 0. 
 SIZE and ROOMS should have positive impacts on the queuing time, i.e. it should be 
that β16 > 0 and β17 > 0. Everything else held constant, a larger apartment should be 
valued higher than a smaller one. 
 Due to the legal limitations of student apartments, STUDENT should have a negative 
impact on the queuing time, i.e. β18 < 0. These contracts should not be considered as 
valuable as ordinary first-hand contracts. Another argument supporting this 
assumption is that students tend to be younger than the population in general, and 
younger people probably tend to have shorter queuing time for natural reasons. 
How the coefficients of AREA_MAJOR and AREA_KUNGS differ from AREA_WEST (which 
they should have belonged to if they were not extracted as separate variables) is harder to 
predict. It is already known that these areas are extremely popular. If this is merely due to the 
price effect, β8 and β9 should be close to β7. On the other hand, if these areas are considered 
attractive in themselves, β8 and β9 should be significantly larger than β7. Formally, the 
following null hypothesis is tested, 
H0: β7 = β8 = β9 
(the high popularity of Majorna and Kungsladugård depend exclusively on the lower rent 
level and other factors controlled for in the models) 
against the alternative hypothesis, 
H1: β8 > β7 and β9 > β7 
(Majorna and Kungsladugård have significant and positive area-specific effects) 
As mentioned in section 2.2., private landlords may choose not to distribute their contracts to 
the applicants with the longest registration time. Therefore, the queuing days required to get 
such contracts may not reflect the relative value of the contract very well. In the most extreme 
case, a really attractive contract would for some reason be given to a household which has 
been registered for only a few days. 
  
15 
 
The most direct way to get around this problem is simply to focus exclusively on apartments 
provided by the public housing companies. This limits the framework in the sense that 
potential differences in public and private housing will be lost, and that fewer observations 
will be used in the empirical section below. However, there are reasons to believe that these 
limitations are not that bad. Firstly, there are hardly any large differences between public 
housing and private housing from the tenant point of view – at least not when the decision is 
taken whether to apply for an apartment or not. Secondly, a large number of public housing 
contracts are distributed in Gothenburg each year, so the number of observations will turn 
out not to be a problem. Thus, the model will be estimated both with and without apartments 
provided by private landlords. Due to the different rules regarding the behavior of private 
and public landlords, the model should have a better fit when only public landlords are 
considered.  
The methodology of Zahir (2005) builds upon the idea is that 1-room, 2-room and 3-room 
apartments are considered different enough for the model to be applied separately for each 
category. For this to be a straight-forward and intuitive approach, apartments with a different 
number of rooms should ideally be considered separate sub-markets. But clearly, as an 
example, there are many 2-room apartments that are larger than some other 3-room 
apartments. Furthermore, it is reasonable to think that many households look for apartments 
within two or more different groups (for instance 3-room and 4-room apartments). Hence, 
the number of rooms will be included as an ordinary explanatory variable here. 
Whether or not to allow for non-linear relationships in the models is not a crystal clear 
matter. To argue for non-linearity by theoretical reasoning is rather difficult, since there is no 
obvious and intuitive reason as for why such nonlinearities would exist. Instead, one can 
consider this to be an empirical issue and include such terms if they are significant 
determinants of the queuing time. 
Lastly, interaction effects between two or more variables might exist. In order to preserve the 
interpretation straight-forwardness of the original model, such interaction effects will be 
introduced and discussed in a separate model. Equation (2) below constitutes a theoretical 
model similar to equation (1), but with interaction effects, 
                                                                          (2) 
where INTERACTIONS contain the different interaction variables (simply one variable 
multiplied by another one). It can for instance be an interaction between RENT and SIZE. If 
such effects matter for households is an empirical matter and will be examined in the results 
section. Additionally, it will be interesting to look for interaction effects between RENT and 
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AREA_MAJOR as well as between RENT and AREA_KUNGS. The main argument is the 
generally lower rent level in old apartment buildings, described in earlier sections. 
 
4. Data and Summary Statistics 
The models in the previous section build upon the fact that the right-hand side apartment 
variables are considered by the households when they apply for apartments through the 
Boplats Göteborg web interface (see Appendix 1). Information on each apartment is stored in 
a database maintained by Boplats Göteborg. The empirical data on apartment characteristics, 
geographical location and queuing days that will be used when estimating the models is taken 
from this database. The data set is not publicly available for confidentiality and privacy 
reasons. 
Data reliability will not be a problem at all. The data on apartment characteristics are 
reported by the landlords and will certainly be verified by the households that get to see the 
apartment. The data on queuing days is generated from actual and revealed consumer 
behavior, in terms of how many days of queuing households are willing to give up in order to 
get a certain contract. The full data set contains data on apartments distributed between 1 
April, 2011 and 30 March, 2012. Table 4-1 below summarizes the data. 
Boplats Göteborg has distributed rental housing contracts through the same system since 
September 2004. Since 2007, public landlords distribute contracts strictly according to 
queuing time (as long as the minimal requirements are fulfilled). The sample between April, 
2011 and March, 2012 should probably be representative for the whole period, since it 
contains thousands of observations and since there have not been any radical changes in the 
conditions on the rental market during the last decade. Nevertheless, depending on what 
sample period is chosen, there would probably be some minor changes in the parameters. 
 Full sample Public landlords Private landlords 
N 6759 3901 2858 
 Mean St.dev. Min Max Mean St.dev. Min Max Mean St.dev. Min Max 
QT (days) 832 584 0 2752 1010 598 0 2752 588 467 0 2723 
RENT (SEK) 5276 2030 1527 17821 5056 1937 1527 17821 5540 2106 1919 17000 
SIZE (m2) 57 22 10 198 58 19 10 147 56 26 10 198 
ROOMS 2.16 0.96 1 8 2.20 0.85 1 6 2.11 1.07 1 8 
STUDENT* 0.13    0.05    0.23    
AREA_CENTR* 0.20    0.09    0.33    
AREA_OTHER* 0.02    <0.01    0.03    
AREA_MOLND* 0.06    0.07    0.05    
AREA_NORTH* 0.21    0.27    0.13    
AREA_PARTI* <0.01    N/A    0.01    
AREA_EAST* 0.07    0.03    0.11    
AREA_WEST* 0.12    0.14    0.09    
AREA_MAJOR* 0.02    0.03    <0.01    
AREA_KUNGS* 0.02    0.02    <0.01    
AREA_HISIN* 0.29    0.34    0.23    
FLOOR_B0* <0.01    <0.01    <0.01    
FLOOR_0* 0.09    0.09    0.08    
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FLOOR_1* 0.22    0.23    0.21    
FLOOR_2* 0.23    0.25    0.21    
FLOOR_3* 0.20    0.22    0.18    
FLOOR_4* 0.08    0.07    0.09    
FLOOR_A4* 0.17    0.13    0.21    
Table 4-1. Summary statistics. 
* Dummy variable. 
Worth noticing is that public landlords did not distribute any contract in the Partille 
municipality during the sample period, through the Boplats Göteborg webpage. Furthermore, 
Hisingen, North, Center and West are the largest area groups in terms of distributed 
contracts. 
The mean queuing time for the full sample is 831 days, with a standard deviation of 584 days. 
On average, households wait for 2 years and 3 months to get an apartment. The queuing time 
tend to be longer for apartments provided by public landlords and shorter for those provided 
by private landlords. The following histograms illustrate how QT is distributed, with percent 
frequency on the vertical axis. 
Figure 4-1. Queuing days and percent frequency. 
Full sample. 
Figure 4-2. Queuing days and percent frequency. 
Public landlords only. 
 
The two histograms look rather different. The reason for this is that while public landlords, as 
described earlier, distribute contracts (more or less) strictly by queuing time, private 
landlords are not forced to follow any particular pattern or rationale. In particular, a 
comparison between the two histograms reveals that many contracts on apartments provided 
by private landlords have been signed by households with very short queuing time.  
Table 4-2 below elaborates on the summary statistics in the Full sample column of the 
previous table. The numbers are now grouped by QT centiles. The first column in table 4-2 
shows summary statistics for the group of apartments with the shortest queuing time, the 
second column is for apartments with medium queuing time and the third column is for 
apartments with long queuing time. 
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 Short QT 
(lowest 10 %) 
Medium QT 
(mid 10 %) 
Long QT  
(highest 10 %) 
N 678 678 676 
 Mean St.dev. Min Max Mean St.dev. Min Max Mean St.dev. Min Max 
QT (days) 58 33 0 122 717 36 655 783 2015 255 1712 2752 
RENT (SEK) 5687 2108 1760 15674 4810 1842 1665 12728 5535 2071 1527 17821 
SIZE (m2) 63 22 10 156 51 22 18 123 62 23 10 198 
ROOMS 2.32 0.97 1 5 1.91 0.95 1 8 2.35 1.00 1 7 
STUDENT* 0.08    0.23    0.05    
AREA_CENTR* 0.11    0.24    0.20    
AREA_OTHER* 0.06    <0.01    0.02    
AREA_MOLND* 0.13    0.04    0.03    
AREA_NORTH* 0.24    0.25    0.21    
AREA_PARTI* 0.01    <0.01    <0.01    
AREA_EAST* 0.09    0.03    0.09    
AREA_WEST* 0.12    0.09    0.10    
AREA_MAJOR* 0.01    <0.01    0.06    
AREA_KUNGS* <0.01    <0.01    0.05    
AREA_HISIN* 0.24    0.34    0.22    
FLOOR_B0* <0.01    0.02    <0.01    
FLOOR_0* 0.08    0.10    0.09    
FLOOR_1* 0.22    0.20    0.24    
FLOOR_2* 0.27    0.21    0.24    
FLOOR_3* 0.19    0.21    0.21    
FLOOR_4* 0.07    0.08    0.07    
FLOOR_A4* 0.16    0.18    0.15    
Table 4-2. Summary statistics grouped by queuing days. Both public and private landlords are considered. 
* Dummy variable. 
The table above gives some hints about the results. In the Short QT column, the share of 
apartments located in the central parts of the city is small. There are almost no apartments 
located in Majorna or Kungsladugård in the Short QT and Medium QT columns. It becomes 
more problematic when trying to identify any clear patterns in RENT, ROOMS, SIZE and 
FLOOR by using summary statistics, though. 
In the Short QT column, one can see that there are observations for which the queuing time is 
zero days. It is not obvious how the fact that some contracts are signed after zero queuing 
days should be interpreted. To be able to obtain unbiased and reliable estimates, these zero-
QT observations must not be abnormal in any sense and should not be too many. A further 
inspection shows that for 23 of the observations (out of 6550), QT = 0. Although 23 is not a 
very large number, the empirical section will briefly discuss how the results are affected. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Following the procedures and standards of empirical studies within the same area, the most 
convenient and straight-forward estimation method is Ordinary Least Squares. OLS 
estimates of the parameters in equations (1) and (2) are shown in table 5-1 below.  
 Full sample Public landlords only 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
RENT -0.06 *** 
(0.006) 
-0.03 ** 
(0.012) 
-0.06 *** 
(0.008) 
0.03 ** 
(0.015) 
AREA_CENTR 498.06 *** 
(23.016) 
497.95 *** 
(23.025) 
752.37 *** 
(31.238) 
789.39 *** 
(30.959) 
AREA_OTHER -343.14 *** -342.27 *** -599.21 ** -663.99 ** 
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(62.701) (62.397) (273.827) (269.741) 
AREA_MOLND -121.13 *** 
(28.465) 
-124.50 *** 
(28.383) 
-99.35 *** 
(31.288) 
-113.60 *** 
(30.969) 
AREA_NORTH -131.01 *** 
(19.770) 
-130.04 *** 
(19.702) 
-124.35 *** 
(21.068) 
-127.55 *** 
(20.834) 
AREA_PARTI -218.93 ** 
(89.699) 
-232.56 *** 
(89.352) 
N/A 
(N/A) 
N/A 
(N/A) 
AREA_EAST 274.00 *** 
(28.679) 
272.11 *** 
(28.545) 
862.78 *** 
(44.243) 
855.80 *** 
(43.574) 
AREA_WEST 215.84 *** 
(22.883) 
214.86 *** 
(22.798) 
376.26 *** 
(25.709) 
362.46 *** 
(25.387) 
AREA_MAJOR 902.24 *** 
(44.756) 
712.54 *** 
(171.566) 
958.90 *** 
(44.503) 
-80.57 
(195.266) 
AREA_KUNGS 925.09 *** 
(51.893) 
1550.29 *** 
(136.377) 
964.78 *** 
(51.027) 
791.27 *** 
(208.662) 
FLOOR_B0 -103.34 
(72.487) 
-94.94 
(72.137) 
-116.06 
(86.606) 
-131.77 
(85.336) 
FLOOR_1 26.94 
(26.782) 
24.35 
(26.719) 
22.39 
(31.099) 
32.88 
(30.740) 
FLOOR_2 39.15 
(26.516) 
35.13 
(26.487) 
47.58 
(30.587) 
57.64 * 
(30.272) 
FLOOR_3 61.62 ** 
(26.938) 
57.53 ** 
(26.923) 
79.09 ** 
(30.973) 
91.30 *** 
(30.672) 
FLOOR_4 48.25 
(32.659) 
50.22 
(32.614) 
58.14 
(39.992) 
84.49 ** 
(39.523) 
FLOOR_A4 33.87 
(27.999) 
25.50 
(27.970) 
35.48 
(34.147) 
50.33 
(33.813) 
SIZE -1.50 
(0.916) 
1.91 
(1.883) 
-2.46 ** 
(1.140) 
13.92 *** 
(2.245) 
ROOMS 94.45 *** 
(15.761) 
48.881 
(46.744) 
118.91 *** 
(19.931) 
-232.59 *** 
(57.324) 
STUDENT -458.42 *** 
(25.862) 
-713.36 *** 
(74.089) 
-465.39 *** 
(37.610) 
-314.55 ** 
(128.659) 
AREA_MAJOR x RENT  - 0.03 
(0.031) 
- 0.20 *** 
(0.037) 
AREA_KUNGS x RENT - -0.12 *** 
(0.024) 
- 0.03 
(0.045) 
SIZE x RENT - -0.0007 ** 
(0.00027) 
- -0.0034 *** 
(0.00038) 
ROOMS x RENT - 0.008 
(0.007) 
- 0.064 *** 
(0.010) 
STUDENT x RENT - 0.07 *** 
(0.017) 
- -0.04 
(0.032) 
_CONSTANT 915.46 *** 
(31.751) 
790.86 *** 
(54.260) 
995.73 *** 
(36.409) 
674.14 *** 
(62.185) 
R-squared 0.2006 0.2092 0.3783 0.3981 
Observations (N) 6549 6549 3799 3799 
Absolute value of standard error in brackets. *** = coefficient significant at 1 % confidence level; ** = coefficient significant at 
5 % confidence level; * = coefficient significant at 10 % confidence level. 
Table 5-1. OLS estimates of the two models. 
The first column shows the estimates for the basic model of equation (1) on the full data set. 
The monthly rent is a significant and negative determinant of the queuing time. The result 
can be interpreted as that a 100 SEK increase in monthly rent of an apartment results in 6 
days shorter queuing time to get a contract on that apartment, ceteris paribus. This is in line 
with the theoretical expectations on the sign of the parameter, described in section 3. 
Between the different geographical areas, the differences are dramatic. Overall, the statistical 
significance is very strong among these parameters. The numbers should be interpreted as 
“extra queuing days required for getting an apartment in this area, rather than a similar 
apartment on Hisingen”. A positive coefficient implies that getting an apartment in this 
particular area requires more queuing days than a similar apartment on Hisingen, while a 
negative coefficient implies that fewer queuing days are required. For instance, an apartment 
contract in western Gothenburg on average requires 216 more days than an apartment on 
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Hisingen. To get an idea of absolute queuing times, the mean QT on all apartments on 
Hisingen in the full sample is 745 days. The corresponding number is 859 days if only public 
landlords are considered. 
The coefficients for Majorna and Kungsladugård turn out to be huge. Although it was known 
beforehand that these areas are popular, it was not obvious if the popularity was due to the 
lower rents or simply due to area characteristics. Yet, by comparing the coefficients, one can 
see that these areas have really strong impact on the dependent variable despite the fact that 
monthly rent is controlled for in the regression. In the first column, AREA_MAJOR and 
AREA_KUNGS both have coefficients of above 900, while the coefficient for the rest of the 
western region is just above 200. A t-test of the estimates rejects the null hypothesis and 
concludes that both of the areas have significant area-specific effects. The immediate 
interpretation is that these two areas for some reason have a strong attraction on the rental 
housing market. This will be further discussed in the next section.  
Overall, the relationship between which floor an apartment is located on and the number of 
queuing days required to get the apartment is very weak. The positive third floor coefficient 
turns out to be the only significant parameter here. Again, there is a large demand surplus on 
the rental housing market. When people decide whether to accept an apartment offer or not, 
they do not seem to take this information into consideration – at least it does not seem to be 
the most important determinant. Perhaps, if the market situation would have been different, 
people would not be that desperate when looking for apartments and therefore choose 
apartments located on their “desired” floor. The interpretation of a FLOOR coefficient in the 
regression is “extra queuing days required for getting an apartment on this floor, rather than 
a similar apartment on floor 0 (entrance floor)”. A positive coefficient implies that an 
apartment on the specific floor requires more queuing days than a similar apartment located 
on floor 0 (and vice versa for a negative coefficient). However, these interpretations are only 
valid for the third floor in the regression table above, due to the low precision of the other 
FLOOR estimates. 
The SIZE and ROOMS parameters are both significant when estimating the equations on the 
sub-sample with public landlords only. In the first column, however, only the ROOMS 
parameter is significant and positive – an extra room on average requires 94 more days in the 
queue, if the rest of the equation is held constant. The outcome that SIZE turns out to be 
insignificant is actually not that problematic. The two variables somewhat capture the same 
information. Clearly, there is much correlation between how many rooms an apartment has, 
and how large it is measured in square meters. A correlation matrix can be found in 
Appendix 2. 
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The STUDENT apartment dummy has a negative and significant parameter in all columns, 
although its magnitude varies. Again, the negative sign was expected, since student 
apartments come with some considerable limitations – they are offered to students only, and 
students must leave them when they quit studying. 
When equation (1) is estimated on contracts provided by public landlords only, some results 
change rather dramatically. Firstly, R2 increases from roughly 20 % to almost 38 %. The 
model captures the relationship with public landlords better. The reason for this has already 
been discussed – public landlords distribute contracts (more or less strictly) according to 
queuing time, while private landlords are not forced to do so. When private landlords choose 
to ignore queuing time and distribute contracts according to other criteria, the relationships 
of equations (1) and (2) break down. The changes in AREA and FLOOR coefficients probably 
result from differences in the housing stock between private and public landlords. 
To be confident about the unbiasedness of the estimates, Appendix 2 contains a lower-limit 
Tobit estimation. The marginal effects suggested by such estimation correspond to the 
coefficients above rather well, indicating that the observations for which QT = 0 do not bias 
the results. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper has examined the determinants of the rental housing demand in Gothenburg. 
Households have been treated as a homogenous mass and the demand has been decomposed 
into apartment characteristics such as the rent level, the number of rooms and the 
geographical area. Prices on rental housing, i.e. rents, are not set freely on the market. 
Therefore, one cannot simply use price information to examine which apartment features are 
attractive and which are not. This study has provided rather unique information on 
preferences, information that can be taken into consideration when planning for an 
expansion of the current rental housing stock. 
The relationships have been modeled in two equations, in which an apartment’s 
characteristics have been assumed to explain the queuing time required to get the apartment. 
Data from the largest distributor of first-hand apartment contracts in Gothenburg has been 
used to estimate the parameters of the models. 
The results show that the monthly rent, the geographical location and the size (measured as 
either square meters or the number of rooms) are significant determinants when it comes to 
how much queuing time people are willing to give up when they are offered a first-hand 
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contract on a specific apartment. Most popular locations are the city center, the western parts 
(including Majorna and Kungsladugård) and the eastern parts. In these districts, a queuing 
time of several years is generally required in order to get a contract. 
The result that a 100 SEK increase in the monthly rent on average only shortens the queuing 
time by 6 days basically suggests that the geographical location of an apartment is currently 
more important to the households than the price. There are at least two interesting 
explanations behind this result. Firstly, as discussed in section 2.1, rents in attractive areas 
are fixed below the market level. Obviously, many households could certainly afford an 
apartment even if the rent would increase rather sharply. It is reasonable to claim that if the 
rents would rise, so would the price sensitivity of the households. Secondly, housing subsidies 
potentially play a role. If households get some fraction of the rent paid by the local 
government each month, the rent sensitivity of the household obviously falls. 
It was known beforehand that Majorna and Kungsladugård are two extremely popular 
districts. The outcome of this study has indeed confirmed, if not strengthened, this view. In 
addition, it has been shown that the lower rents (resulting from the utility value principle and 
the rather old housing estate in the areas) cannot fully explain the popularity. The areas have 
something else that is considered super attractive by applicants. The characteristic feeling of 
the area, the architecture and the location (close to the city center, but also close to more 
calm areas such as parks and jogging tracks) almost certainly play key roles. Thus, although 
more or less all contracts are accepted by someone almost immediately due to demand 
surplus, apartments in areas such as Majorna and Kungsladugård are what the people 
demand the most. This result could also be linked to Coolen and Hoekstra (2001) and 
examined from a values and goals point of view. Which values are associated with the 
households in Majorna and Kungsladugård? 
The regression results do not establish any clear relationships between what floor an 
apartment is located on and how attractive it is considered by applicants. The only exception 
is that an apartment on the third floor is considered more attractive than one on the entrance 
floor – a result significant in both model specifications and sub-samples. Since many 
buildings contain three floors only, getting a contract on the third floor often times imply that 
the apartment is located on the top floor. If this is something that people like, it might very 
well explain the significant third floor parameter. Furthermore, the fact that there is a large 
demand surplus for rental housing in Gothenburg perhaps makes households prioritize other 
apartment features and accept apartments independent of what floors they are located on – 
leading to an overall lack of statistical significance here. Apparently, it can also be that 
households simply do not tend to have any specific preferences regarding this particular 
feature. 
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7. Suggestions for Further Research 
The Swedish rental housing market in general and the preferences in particular is an 
interesting area to study for many reasons. The price-setting system is heavily debated and 
will most likely be subject to changes, at least within a decade or so. Mapping the preferences 
on this market will facilitate the design of a new system. For landlords and other players on 
the market, insights about tenant preferences may very well generate substantial profit 
possibilities. From the policy-maker point of view, rental housing preferences is key 
information when trying to maximize the utility in the society as a whole. 
An interesting approach would be to compare these preferences with the market for tenant-
owned apartments. This would be a rather straight-forward task, since the prices on such 
apartments reflect current supply and demand relationships. Naturally, people are ready to 
pay for features that they find attractive and valuable. Once the preferences are mapped, a 
number of interesting questions arise. Do the preferences on the two markets differ? If so, 
why and how do they differ? 
Additionally, this study could very well be expanded to include household characteristics. In 
practice, such expansion would raise some of the issues and concerns identified by Kim 
(1995) discussed in section 2.3. Allowing for household heterogeneity would complicate the 
estimation process, but also broaden the analysis and the importance of the results 
considerably. Such results could for instance be used by policy-makers when trying to target a 
certain group of people with social and economic improvements. 
Another interesting angle would be to examine the consistency of preferences over time. This 
could be done within the framework used in this study or in a richer model including 
household characteristics. 
Finally, research on the distribution of available contracts could be essential in solving the 
problems people face on the rental housing market today. Both efficiency and equity 
concerns could be examined in such study. The current situation of excess demand forces 
people to wait for several years in order to get a rental contract. This problem certainly makes 
a fraction of the households consider buying apartments, although they actually prefer to 
rent. Extra pressure is then put on the market for tenant-owned apartments and households 
are more or less forced to borrow large amounts of money. To develop the distribution 
process could, to some extent, improve the situation for the households. As an example, a 
new proposal from Boplats Göteborg suggests that they should start charging a queuing fee. 
Households that really need an apartment would probably pay this fee, while households that 
are in the queue “just in case” would perhaps decide to leave.  
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Appendix 1 
This appendix will very briefly describe the Boplats Göteborg web interface, through which 
households apply for apartments. The theoretical model builds upon the fact that this is what 
is considered by the households when they take the decisions. Also, the data that is used in 
the empirical section was partly generated through this interface. 
 
Figure A1-1. The welcome screen. 
The above screen shows up after user log in. Although English has been chosen as preferred 
language, Figure A1-1 shows that some text on the welcome page is not translated from 
Swedish. However, there is some key information about the specific household shown on the 
screen, and this is presented English: 
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 The user registered on the 30th of October, 2009 
 There are totally 92 apartments available (not user-specific) 
 There are 3 apartments available that matches the profile of the user 
 The user has active applications on 14 apartments 
According to Boplats Göteborg, it is more or less impossible to get a contract on an apartment 
that does not match the user profile. Users are encouraged to only apply for contracts that 
match their profile, and they should ideally spend some time on configuring the profile 
correctly. 
 
Figure A1-2. Available apartments that match the current user profile. 
The three apartments that match the user profile are shown in Figure A1-2. The first row is 
shaded, which indicates that this apartment has already been applied for by the user. Some 
key information about each apartment is also shown. There is a link on each row, called 
“Details”, which will provide further information about any of the apartments. The next 
screen, in Figure A1-3, is the “Details” page. 
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Figure A1-3. Apartment details and “Apply” button. 
This is the apartment-specific page, on which the user may apply for a specific apartment. 
Here, some of the variables used in the study are presented to the applicant. The logotype in 
the top-right corner suggests that this particular apartment is owned by “Bostads AB 
Poseidon”, one of the larger public landlords in the city. 
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Appendix 2 
This appendix contains additional information about the data used in the study. Firstly, the 
city geography is outlined. Secondly, the potential problem of the observations with QT = 0 
are examined. Lastly, a correlation matrix is presented. 
The main areas used when creating the AREA dummy variables are illustrated in the map 
below. 
 
Figure A2-1. The main areas of Gothenburg. 
The areas translate into the following variable names: 
 Centrum : AREA_CENTR 
 Norr: AREA_NORTH 
 Öster: AREA_EAST 
 Väster: AREA_WEST 
 Hisingen: AREA_HISIN 
In addition, the study included three AREA dummies capturing relevant municipalities other 
than Gothenburg. These were Mölndal (AREA_MOLND) located south of the city, Partille 
(AREA_PARTI) located north-east of the city, and other municipalities close to Gothenburg 
(AREA_OTHER). 
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Obviously, the lower limit of the QT variable is zero. It does not make sense to assume 
negative queuing times. How the group of QT = 0 observations affects the results can be 
examined by a lower-limit Tobit estimation. The marginal effects for equation (1) when the 
full sample is considered are presented in the table below, together with the corresponding 
estimates from table 5-1. 
  (1) OLS  (1) Tobit (MFX) 
RENT -0.06 *** 
(0.006) 
-0.06 *** 
(0.006) 
AREA_CENTR 498.06 *** 
(23.016) 
497.84 *** 
(23.052) 
AREA_OTHER -343.14 *** 
(62.701) 
-346.31 *** 
(62.875) 
AREA_MOLND -121.13 *** 
(28.465) 
-121.28 *** 
(28.511) 
AREA_NORTH -131.01 *** 
(19.770) 
-131.13 *** 
(19.802) 
AREA_PARTI -218.93 ** 
(89.699) 
-218.36 ** 
(89.824) 
AREA_EAST 274.00 *** 
(28.679) 
273.42 *** 
(28.727) 
AREA_WEST 215.84 *** 
(22.883) 
216.03 *** 
(22.918) 
AREA_MAJOR 902.24 *** 
(44.756) 
900.75 *** 
(44.835) 
AREA_KUNGS 925.09 *** 
(51.893) 
925.50 *** 
(51.966) 
FLOOR_B0 -103.34 
(72.487) 
-102.42 
(72.590) 
FLOOR_1 26.94 
(26.782) 
27.30 
(26.825) 
FLOOR_2 39.15 
(26.516) 
38.56 
(26.562) 
FLOOR_3 61.62 ** 
(26.938) 
62.11 ** 
(26.981) 
FLOOR_4 47.25 
(32.659) 
47.91 
(32.716) 
FLOOR_A4 33.87 
(27.999) 
34.13 
(28.047) 
SIZE -1.50 
(0.916) 
-1.53 * 
(0.917) 
ROOMS 94.45 *** 
(15.761) 
94.87 *** 
(15.790) 
STUDENT -458.42 *** 
(25.862) 
-460.20 *** 
(25.916) 
_CONSTANT -0.06 *** 
(0.006) 
- 
Table A2-1. OLS estimates and marginal effects from a Tobit estimation of equation (1). 
The differences between the marginal effects from the Tobit regression and the OLS 
estimates are negligible. The conclusion is that the OLS estimates are not severely affected by 
the lower-limit group of observations at QT = 0. Thus, correct inference can be made from 
table 5-1. 
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Finally, a correlation matrix for some of the variables is provided below. 
 QT RENT SIZE ROOMS 
QT 1.0000 - - - 
RENT -0.0139 1.0000 - - 
SIZE -0.0246 0.7793 1.0000 - 
ROOMS -0.0032 0.6686 0.8897 1.0000 
Table A2-2. Correlation matrix. 
Size and rooms are highly correlated (0.89) which explains why the SIZE parameter is 
insignificant in the table 5-1 regression – SIZE and ROOMS somewhat contain the same 
information. 
